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Case No. 870377 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Intervenor appeals from a final Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court/ Judge Dennis Frederick/ granting a summary judgment 
to Defendant and denying summary judgment to Intervenor. The 
basic dispute between Hiltsley, plaintiff/ and Ryder/ defendant/ 
has been before this Court on a prior occasion and a decision was 
made on June 10/ 1987 reversing the judgment. The language of 
this Court in its decision reads as follows: "Because the trial 
court should have required that Etta Wood's estate be joined before 
deciding the case as it did/ we reverse the case and remand for 
-2-
joinder of Etta Wood's estate." The remittitur from the Supreme 
2 I Court was filed with the County Clerk of Salt Lake County on 
July 10/ 1987. On July 20/ 1987/ the personal representative of 
the estate of Etta Wood was ordered joined as a party plaintiff. 
On July 30/ 1987 the Complaint in Intervention was filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court. Answer of Respondent was filed on 
August 17/ 1987. Intervenor, on the 21st of August/ 1987/ filed 
7 a Motion for Summary Judgment with Memorandum in support of the 
8 motion. Respondent filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
q September 4, 1987. The matter was duly argued and submitted and 
the Court/ on September 14/ 1987/ granted Respondent's Cross-Motion| 
for Summary Judgment and denied Intervenor/Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
This matter is now before the Court on Intervenor's appeal 
from the trial court's order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 Intervenor seeks reversal of the trial court judgment and 
16 for judgment that the sums determined by Judge Croft as held in 
trust amounting to $43/623.43 be determined by the Court to be 
assets of the estate of Etta Wood and for judgment accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Intervenor/Appellant in this matter/ pursuant to the order 
of this Court/ filed her Complaint in Intervention. The personal 
representative then moved for summary judgment. The motion was 
22 I based upon the ground that the matter in issue as to the ownership 
23 of the assets of the estate of Etta Wood was a basic issue tried 
-3-
by Judge Croft in the original action between Hiltsley and Ryder, 
9 I Judge Croft/ in his memorandum opinion/ states as follows: 
It seems clear to me that Milton must be considered 
3 | as having received that $30/000.00 in trust for Etta 
and this money was not his money to invest as he did 
4 | and did not become his upon her death to give away 
or use for his own purposes. It is thus apparent 
^ I that at least $10/000.00 each of the three accounts 
mentioned came from Etta's funds. (Tr. 53) 
" The document which supports the trial court finding was 
7 introduced without objection from any party. It is the journal 
8 of the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley (Ex.10). There are three 
g\ pages in which Milton Hiltsley refers to Etta Wood's estate. 
Page 250 contains the following notations: 
For Etta: accounting 
10 
II 
12 
13 
16 
17 
9/19 - Ck to Public Service of New Mexico for 
utilities 9.68 
9/24 - Transferred ace to Tracy Collins 2,000.00 
Deposited 409.71 
Transferred 2,409.91 
14 I 9/24 - Check cash for running exp to hosp. 75.00 
$147.47 bal in New Mexico checking 
15 | 9/28 - Am. Savings to bring savings from 
New Mexico. 
Page 253 dated October 5/ 1979 reads as follows: 
10/5/79 - Received money from Etta's account 
transferred to Salt Lake from Albuquerque/ 
18 | N.M. 30,000.00 + 314.00 - a shortage of 8.+. 
The Am. Savings will check this shortgage for me. 
Placed $10,000.00 in savings pass book 
" $10,000.00 in money market at A.M. Savings 
" $10,000.00 in money mkt @ P.F.S. 
19 
20 
2'I Neither party to the original action questioned the 
22 J authenticity of these entries in the Milton J. Hiltsley journal. 
23 Page 262 reads as follows: 
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| J Etta died on January 20, 1980 - 9:30 P.M. She was 
buried at Santa Fe, New Mexico on January 23/ 1980 
9 I at 2 P.M. a graveside service, 
A small but very nice service and burial. The same 
3 I type stone as Alton's, is to be placed on her grave* 
Air fare 480-00 
4 | Mortician 1260.68 
Flowers 15.00 
Head stone 143.68 
Telephone 11.25 
Meals @ Santa Fe 15.00 
6
 2 0 2 5 . 6 1 
5 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
7 There was no evidence contrary to the written exhibit. At 
3 no place in the journal is there any claim of Milton Hiltsley or 
the defendant that these funds were theirs by reason of gift or 
other transfer from Etta Wood during her lifetime. 
Judge Croft traced the three $10/000.00 deposits through 
the bank accounts and entered judgment that defendant pay the 
personal representative of Etta Wood $10/000.00 with interest 
from the first of November/ 1979. This sum was invested on 
14 J November 1/ 1979 in the condo purchased by Milton Hiltsley and 
15 I Hallalene Ryder. 
Judge Croft determined that an account No. 11-0132799 at 
American Savings & Loan contained Etta's funds. August 25/ 1981/ 
the day before his death/ deceased placed the name of Hallalene 
Ryder on the account as joint tenant. 
The third $10/000.00 was traced by Judge Croft into Account 
No. 003-300/723-6 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan. 
2 1 Defendant Hallalene Ryder's name was also on this account as a 
22 I joint tenant. This deposit was traced through several accounts. 
23 On the death of Milton Hiltsley/ the funds were in Account 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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| No. 715-101,422-2 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan. It 
stood in the name of Milton J. Hiltsley and Hallalene Ryder as 
joint tenants. 
Following Hiltsley's death/ without the deposit certificate/ 
Hallalene Ryder withdrew the balance in the account of $18/363.65. 
Transfer was made by the bank in reliance upon an Affidavit and 
6 Guarantee for Lost Evidence of Account/ Exhibit 30-P/ signed by 
7 defendant. She swore that the following was true: 
g I/We Hallalene Ryder and Milton J. Hiltsley (Deceased) 
being duly sworn on my/our oath(s)/ do hereby declare 
. and represent that I am/we are the owner(s) of Savings 
y
 J Passcard/Passbook/Certificate of Account No. 715-101422-2 
issued by PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
10 | hereinafter designated ASSOCIATION, of Salt Lake City, 
Utah/ on or about the 4th day of September/ 1981 that 
I/we have not in any way disposed of said Passcard/ 
Passbook/Certificate or of our interest therein; that 
said Passcard/Passbook/Certificate has been lost/ 
misplaced or destroyed/ and I am/we are unable to 
produce the same. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
The money market certificate which represented the Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan account was found by plaintiff in a secret 
tin box hiding place after Milton J. Hiltsley's death (see Finding 
No. 18, Tr. 92). 
17 1 Trial court found that at the time of the Affidavit (Ex. 30), 
18 defendant knew that the certificate of deposit was in the 
19 possession of plaintiff (see Finding No. 21 of Findings of Fact, 
Tr. 93). Court found also that the co-owner of the certificate, 
one Fred Hansen/ claims no contribution to the account and that 
his name was on the account as an accommodation to defendant and 
at her request (see Findings of Fact No. 20/ Tr. 93). 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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Judge Croft's Findings of Fact are based on evidence which 
was not disputed by any contrary evidence. 
INTERVENOR PLEADINGS 
3 Intervener's Complaint in Intervention makes claim on the 
4 J assets that were determined by Judge Croft to be assets which 
came from Etta Wood. 
The Complaint alleges that during the lifetime of Milton J. 
Hiltsley he had a confidential relationship with Etta Wood/ his 
sister/ and handled for her and on her behalf her assets which 
were in his possession (Par. 4, Complaint in Intervention/ Tr. 
590). These allegations are not disputed. 
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment/ defendant recites as uncontroverted facts 
12 I the appointment of Ruth S. Hiltsley as personal representative 
of Milton J. Hiltsley/ the fact that she/ in her representative 
capacity and personally/ brought the original action against 
defendant. She sets forth several of the findings of Judge Croft 
including paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Findings and paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this court's decision. She cites also as uncontroverted 
the Findings of Judge Croft contained in paragraph 20 (Tr. 93) 
18 J relating to present state of the Prudential Federal Savings & 
19 J Lean account. Judge Croft signed his judgment on March 29/ 1983. 
Defendant recites also that it is uncontroverted that Judge Croft 
ordered the defendant to pay the estate of Etta Wood the 
$10/000.00 represented by a contribution to the purchase price 
of defendant's condo and that the trial court then ordered 
defendant to pay the American Savings & Loan Association 
-7-
| J Certificate No. 11-013277-9 and the Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association Account No. 003-300,723-6 to Etta Wood's estate. 
Plaintiff was granted judgment for $4,924.66/ her share of 
a tenancy in common account which she did not sign off. 
It is undisputed that the trial court awarded defendant an 
American Savings & Loan passbook account on which she was a joint 
° tenant with Milton J. Hiltsley. It was uncontroverted also that 
7 Etta Wood/ a sister of Milton J. Hiltsley, died on January 20, 19801 
8 and that Douglas P. Simpson was appointed her personal representative 
9 on May 25, 1983. 
A fact not admitted as uncontroverted by defendant is the 
following findings by Judge Croft: 
10 
Thus it would appear that the total amounts in these 
12 I two accounts, together with the $10,000 used on the 
condominium purchase, would all have to be considered 
as funds which decedent held in trust for Etta Wood 
at the time of her death and such would be subject to 
probate as part of Etta Woodfs estate. (Tr. 94) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
In Finding No. 16, subparagraph (d), Court found that the 
sum of $9,849,32, part of a tenancy in common account, was to be 
divided between the tenants in common, Ruth Hiltsley and deceased/ 
each having an interest of $4,924.66 (Tr. 90). The Court 
18 I concluded that Ruth Hiltsley should be awarded in her individual 
19 J capacity the sum of $4,924.66, one-half of the tenancy in common 
balance invested in defendant's condo(Tr. 94, Conclusion 1). 
Conclusions of Law then allocated to the estate of Etta Wood 
$10,000.00 out of the investment in the condominium (Par. 2, 
Conclusions). The balance in the account at American Savings & 
Loan, 11-013277-9, and Account No. 003-300723-6 at Prudential 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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Federal Savings & Loan (Conclusions/ Tr. 96). 
It is undisputed that this Court in its decision/ after 
accurately reciting the Findings by the trial court/ then 
determined that because the estate of Etta Wood was not a party/ 
the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the 
estate of Etta Wood. 
6 This Court then ordered: 
7 J Because the trial court should have required that 
Etta Wood's estate be joined before deciding the 
case as it did/ we reverse the case and remand for 
joinder Etta Wood's estate. 
9 in Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion/ he/ while 
10 concurring in the result/ states: 
I would advise the trial court that it erred in 
finding a constructive trust on the state of the 
facts before it. 
The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant in 
the trial court stated that the motion was upon the ground that 
there was no material issue of fact and defendant was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law and that the motion was based upon 
the pleadings and the Memorandum in Support of the Cross-Motion 
17 I (R. 614-615). 
18 The Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment/ after reciting some of the uncontroverted facts, 
under points and authorities/ sets forth as its point and 
authority: Intervenor's Claims are Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. The position is that the statute of limitations 
started to run on May 25/ 1983/ the day of the appointment of 
Intervenor as personal representative. It further appears that 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
19 
-9-
her position is that from May 25, 1983 until July 29, 1987, a 
period of four years and two months elapsed, and therefore the 
Intervener's claim was barred (Tr. 611-12). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SECTION 78-12-40, U.C.A. GRANTS 
INTERVENOR A YEAR IN WHICH TO 
5 I FILE HER COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 
6 J The statute on which parties both rely is Section 78-12-40, 
U.C.A., which is entitled "Effect of failure of action not on 
merits". It reads as follows: 
7 
8
 § 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
9 | thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff 
fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
10 I than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law 
or contract for commencing the same shall have expired, 
the plaintiff/ or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
This Court has on two separate occasions interpreted the 
meaning of the statute and applied it to cases before it. The 
first case is Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 
507 (1956). This was an action in which various parties sought 
16 J to quiet title to land in Uintah County. Some of the parties had 
17 I not joined in the action as plaintiffs but were named as defendant* 
This Court, in unanimous opinion, held as follows concerning the 
proper interpretation of 78-12-40; 
Plaintiffs maintain that this statute by its express 
20 | terms extends the statute of limitations only to 
'plaintiffs', and that it cannot be invoked by 
2| | defendants. We think, however, that the purpose 
behind the statute is plain and that the legislature 
9~ . intended that anyone who had a cause in litigation 
' which was dismissed for some reason 'otherwise than 
uP° n t h e merits' should have a reasonable time, which 
-10-
is set as one year/ to reassert and attempt to establish 
his rights in court. There is no reason to believe 
that the legislature had any disposition to favor 
2 I 'plaintiffs1 over any other class of litigants. We 
think that the word 'plaintiff as used in this section 
3 | was meant to include not only the party who brings 
the action/ but any party who affirmatively seeks 
4 I relief/ as did the defendants here/ in this and the 
prior action. 
^ ' In the case at bar/ Intervenor/ while not a party to the 
6 I original action/ was a person whose claim was adjudicated and 
7 I for whom the trial court granted substantial rights. 
As is clear from a reading of Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs/ 
supra/ the word "plaintiff" should not be given a restrictive 
interpretation but should include any party who affirmatively 
seeks relief in this or in the prior action. The Intervenor in 
this action/ during the time before the statute of limitations 
had expired/ filed her petition with this court to be joined in 
13 J the action as an intervenor. The motion was filed on June 30/ 
14 I 1983 in the Utah supreme Court and was denied September 19/ 1983, 
15 It is clear then that Intervenor appeared and sought the 
relief granted her by Judge Croft prior to the time that the 
statute of limitations had run. 
A general principle of law seems to be that these statutes 
which toll the running of the statute of limitations are to be 
liberally construed in order to accomplish the purpose of the 
statute. See 51 Am Jur 2d/ Sec. 143/ page 714/ Re Goldsworthy/ 
211 45 NM406, 115 P.2d 627, 148 ALR 722. The language of the New 
22 Mexico Supreme Court is as follows: 
23 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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We see no cogent reason to strive to discover a 
contrary legislative intent. In the first place/ 
the law favors right of action rather than the right 
of limitation. Gresham v. Talbot/ 326 Mo 517/ 31 
SW2d 766. Therefore/ a statute which tolls the 
3 | statute of limitations should be liberally construed 
in order to accomplish that purpose. 
4 " 
5 
2 
The United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & 
Construction Co. v. Utah/ 94 Sup Ct 765/ 414 U.S. 538/ 38 L.ed.2d 
6 713/ ruled that persons who were in a class were entitled to 
7 proceed after a class action had been dismissed upon the grounds 
8 that the number of parties in the class were not sufficiently 
large. The Court held members of the class could bring their 
individual suits after the statutory period had expired. The 
case set forth public policy concerning statutes of limitations 
generally. Headnote 9 states as follows: 
9 
10 
12 
13 
Statutory limitation periods are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost/ memories have faded and 
14 j witnesses have disappeared. Clayton Act/ Sec. 4B/ 
5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 15b, 16(b). 
15 [ 
Recent cases have followed the Supreme Court ruling. 
16 ! 
A number of cases have permitted the limitation to be 
'' I tolled where a wrong party was sued in the very beginning by the 
18 I plaintiff. See Cox v. Ohio Parole Commission/ 31 Ohio App.3d 
19 216/ 509 N.E.2d 1276 (1986), an action filed aginst individual 
„ I members of the Parole Commission. Proper defendant was the 
Parole Commission. There the Ohio Supreme Court held: 
2 1 ; 
Moreover/ the savings statute is remedial in nature 
22 | and is to be given a liberal construction. See 
Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mutl. Ins. Co./ 
23 | (1960), 171 Ohio St. 82, 12 0.0.2d 92, 167 N.E.2d 774. 
-12-
I See, also/ Chadwick v. Barba Lou/ Inc«/ (1982)/ 
69 Ohio St.2d 222/ 23 0.0.3d 232/ 481 N.E.2d 660. 
Pay Surgicals/ Inc. v. State Tax Commission/ 469 N.Y.S.2d 
3 262 (1983)/ recites that the tolling statutes are designed to 
4 ensure the right of a litigant who diligently seeks recourse in 
the courts. The broad purpose of the statute would be aborted by 
narrow construction. See/ also/ Morrissey v. Board of Education/ 
291 A.2d 1126, 40 Conn. Sup. 266; Bradley v. Burnett/ 687 S.W.2d 
53. 
The Intervenor here/ as soon as the facts became known 
9 about the disposition of the assets of the estate of Etta Wood/ 
10 J made every effort to assert its claim against defendant. The 
personal representative was promptly appointed and a Motion to 
Intervene was filed by him in this court. From that time on/ 
defendant was apprised of plaintiff's position. The decision 
of Judge Croft was even more effective in giving to defendant 
notice of the interest of the estate of Etta Wood in assets 
passed from Milton Hiltsley/ deceased/ to the defendant. 
This court interpreted 78-12-40 in the case of Dunn v. Kelly 
5 
6 
7 
8 
20 
21 
22 
23 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
I7| 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983). The facts in the Dunn case are clearly 
18 J distinguishable from the present facts. In the Dunn case/ a 
ip reported child had filed an action through his guardian ad litem. 
During the proceedings it was discovered that said child was not 
the child of the deceased and the court dismissed his action. 
Subsequent to the time that the statute of limitations had run/ 
plaintiff there was appointed personal representative. He then 
filed an action to obtain damages for all of the heirs of the 
-13-
I deceased Nelson Dunn/ Jr. This court held that there was no legal 
relationship between the original plaintiff Brandunn Waiters 
and the plaintiffs. there was no right to claim the benefits of 
the statute tolling the time because of the case filed by a 
guardian ad litem. 
£ I 
u
 Intervenor respectfully submits that the statute of 
6 limitations has not run and should not be made a bar to its action 
7 I for assets which were clearly and properly the assets of Etta Wood1 
estate. 8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
POINT II. THE CLEAR EVIDENCE CONVINCED THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST EXISTED. 
The majority opinion of this court did not discuss the 
question of whether or not a constructive trust of the Wood 
assets in the hands of Hiltsley had been properly determined by 
Judge Croft. However/ in the concurring opinion of Justice 
14 I Zimmerman/ it appears that he had some question as to whether or 
15 not the evidence presented to Croft was sufficient to establish 
the relationship of trustee and trustor between Hiltsley and Wood. 
(Pg 1026, 738 P.2d). 
The facts relating to the relationship between Hiltsley and 
Wood are undisputed. Relevant to consideration of the constructiv< 
trust are the following facts: 
(1) On October 5/ 1979/ Hiltsley received from his sister, 
211 Wood, $30,000.00. At that time. Wood was in Salt Lake City/ 
22 I either in the hospital or at Hiltsley's home (R. 89/ Croft 
„ , Finding No. 15) 
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(2) Etta Wood died on January 20/ 1980. 
(3) Wood was Hiltsley's sister. 
(4) Hiltsley managed Wood's affairs after she came to Salt 
Lake City from Albuquerque/ New Mexico. Hiltsley acted as Woodfs 
representative/ paid her funeral bills/ and kept an account of 
5 I her burial expenses (see pgs 250/ 253/ 262 of Exhibit 10). 
6 (5) Judge Croft found that it was clear that Hiltsley 
7 received the $30/000.00 from Etta Wood in trust for her (Finding 
No. 25, R. 94). 
(6) Ryder makes no claim that any of the funds in the 
accounts where Hiltsley deposited Wood money came from her 
resources. 
Footnote 5 of the opinion of this court Hiltsley v. Ryder, 
738 P.2d 1024/ pg 1026/ states as follows: 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 J In making this disposition/ we in no way rule upon 
the merits of the constructive trust issue. To do 
14 J so would be improper since the record was developed 
without representation by Etta Wood's estate. However/ 
for the benefit of the trial court/ we refer it to 
Ashton v. Ashton/ 733 P.2d 147/ 151-52 (Utah 1987), 
and Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1984). 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
The trial court, in determining the summary judgment issues/ 
apparently did not consider the questions of constructive trust 
and the cases cited in Footnote 5. Since the facts relating to 
the establishment of a trust were found by Judge Croft to exist 
20 I and the relevant facts are undisputed/ it appears to Intervenor 
2| J that this is a matter that is a question of law only for the 
99 - court to decide. 
In the cases cited in Footnote 5/ the relevant facts 
23 " 
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| relating to the establishment of constructive trust were before 
2 this court in a different scenario/ but nevertheless the court's 
decision/ Intervenor believes/ is pertinent and relevant to her 
rights and the case now before this court. 
In Ashton v. Ashton/ 733 P.2d 147/ the relationship was 
that of brothers. The constructive trust was imposed upon a 
brother. There were the rights of a joint tenant to be considered 
7 by the court. The court held: "Findings of fact/ whether based 
8 on oral or documentary evidence/ shall not be set aside unless 
n clearly erroneous/ and due regard shall be given to the opportuni 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
This quote is from Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
It is Intervenor's position that Judge Croft's decision was 
not clearly erroneous when he determined that Hiltsley held the 
assets of Wood in trust. 
Defendant/ as far as Intervener is able to determine/ has 
15 J never attempted to make a showing that the trial court's Findings 
16 of Fact were "clearly erroneous". 
The majority opinion then sets forth the law concerning 
constructive trusts and cites the numerous authorities in Utah 
which have supported establishment of such trusts. See Footnote 
6/ 733 P.2d 150/ which reads as follows: 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
See, e.g./ In re Estate of Hock/ 655 P„2d 1111/ 
1115 (Utah 1982); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca/ 572 
P.2d 708, 710, (Utah 1977); Hawkins v. P~erry, 
123 Utah 16, 23, 253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953); Haws-v. 
22 1 Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 216, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (1949). 
23 Ashton v. Ashton also sets forth the sections of the 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
14 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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Restatement of Trusts and then reconciled the language of that 
section with the court's rulings in Park v. Zions First National 
Bank/ 673 P.2d 590 (1983)/ where the court had occasion to 
construe and compare the language of the Restatement of Trusts/ 
Section 442/ and the Restatement of Restitution/ Section 160. 
In Park the court held: 
6 J Section 160 presents the broadest possible 
application of a constructive trust. It provides 
7 | that a constructive trust may arise 'where a person 
holding title to property is subject to an equitable 
g I duty to convey it to another on the ground that he 
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to 
retain it . . .' Such breadth has also been 
^ described as follows: 
Constructive trusts include all those instances 
in which a trust is raised by the doctrines of 
equity for the purpose of working out justice 
in the most efficient manner/ where there is no 
intention of the parties to create such a relation/ 
12 | and in most cases contrary to the intention of 
the one holding the legal title/ and where there 
13 J is no express or implied/ written or verbal/ 
declaration of the trust. 
In Parks v. Zions First National Bank/ a material difference 
15 is that the relationship was that of husband and wife rather than 
16 brother and sister. Where a husband and wife relationship exists 
17 and there is a transfer of property/ courts have held that a 
gift may be presumed. However/ where the relationship is that 
of brother and sister, no such presumption arises. 
In Ashton v. Ashton/ the court finally determined that the 
trust existed on the transfer from brother to brother which 
bound the joint tenant of the trustee, in that instance his wife, 
and imposed a trust on the assets transferred by a deceased 
23 brother. 
12 
13 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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The other case cited by the court in the decision on this 
matter is Baker v. Pattee/ 684 P.2d 632. In Baker v. Pattee/ 
a trust was determined not to exist. The question of whether or 
not a confidential relationship existed/ however/ was discussed 
and the language of the court/ Intervenor submits/ is especially 
^ applicable to the relationship that existed between Hiltsley/ 
6 the minister/ and Wood/ his sister. This court stated: 
7 J [12/ 13] A confidential relationship is presumed 
between parent and child/ attorney and client/ and 
o J trustee and cestui que trust. Blodgett v. Martsch/ 
1
 Utah, 500 P.2d 298 (1978). The same holds true 
between a spiritual advisor and a dying man. 
^ J Corporation of the Members of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Watson/ 25 Utah 45/ 
10 | 69 P.531 (1902). Where a confidential relationship 
exists/ a presumption of unfairness arises which || | must be overcome by countervailing evidence/ and 
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence 
of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Robertson v. Campbell/ Utah 674 P.2d 1226 (1983) 
(finding of undue influence in execution of trust 
shifted burden to defendant to prove absence of 
undue influence in a subsequent alleged ratification 
14 | of the trust); Johnson v. Johnson/ 9 Utah 2d 40/ 
337 P.2d 420 (1959); In re Swan's Estate/ 4 Utah 2d 
15 I 277, 293 P.2d 683 (19567T In all other relationships 
the existence of a confidential relationship becomes 
a question of fact. Blodgett v. Martsch/ supra. 
The relationship between trustor and trustee in the case at 
bar is that of brother and sister. The question of whether or 
not this relationship gives rise to an inference of gift was 
discussed by this court in Matter of Estate of Hock/ 655 P.2d 1111 
The court there also had the relationship of brother and sister 
2 1 I before it and the decision was that this relationship did not 
22 J give rise to an inference that a gift was intended. This court 
3 , held: 
2 
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| [9] Sections 442 and 443 of Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts provide that if the transfer of property is 
made to one person, the purchase price is paid by 
another, and the transferee is a 'wife, child or other 
natural object of bounty of the person by whom the 
3 J purchase price is paid,' a purchase money resulting 
trust will not arise unless the one paying the purchase 
4 | price manifests an intention that the transferee should 
not have the beneficial interest in the property. 
c I Comment a. of Sec. 442 notes that this exception to 
the resulting trust rule does not apply in the case 
of brothers and sisters, aunts or uncles or nieces 
° I or nephews where the payer does not stand in loco 
parentis to the legal titleholder. We hold that 
7 | where the funds of a sibling are used to purchase 
property and the legal title is held by another sibling, 
3 I the presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the 
payer will arise as if no family relationship existed 
between the parties. 
9 
10 
12 
13 
Both in Ashton v. Ashton, supra, and in Hawkins v. Perry, 
123 Utah 16, a party other than the original trustee claimed an 
interest. In both cases the interest was that of the wife of 
the trustee. In both cases this court held that the co-tenant 
acquired no interest which would be independent of the trust in 
14 I favor of the trustor unless it could be shown that the relation-
15 I ship of bona fide purchaser existed. 
It is undisputed that defendant gave no consideration for 
the interest that she got from Milton Hiltsley. Neither she nor 
Hansen claim that they have paid any consideration for whatever 
interests the documents create. 
In Ashton v. Ashton, supra, and Hawkins v. Perry, supra, 
a confidential relationship was found to exist. In Hawkins v. 
2 1 Perry the trustee was the uncle of a minor child 16 years of age 
22 and also a minister. 
23 It is respectfully submitted that the undisputed facts and 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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I 
2 
10 
13 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Croft that a trust existed and that the assets of Wood were held 
by Hiltsley in trust for her. 
POINT III. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL 
3 | ESTOPPEL, INTERVENOR SHOULD BE GRANTED 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT AND THE 
4 | ITEMS AWARDED BY THE COURT DECISION 
GRANTED TO HER. 
Collateral estoppel has been the subject matter of numerous 
6 decisions by this court. In Searle Brothers v« Searle/ 588 P.2d 
7 I 689 (1978)/ this court followed th lead of the California Supreme 
3 i Court enunciated in Bernhard v* Bank of America National Trust & 
I Savings Association/ 19 Cal.2d 807/ 122 P.2d 892 (1942). The 
decision sets up four tests for applying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. They are: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
12 | identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
14 J 3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
15 J adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently/ fully 
and fairly litigated? 16 
'' I Since Searle/ the court has applied in a number of cases 
18 I the doctrine of collateral estoppel without varying from the 
19 standards set forth in Searle. They are Wilde v. Mid-Century 
Insurance Company/ 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981); Shaer v. State by 
and Through Utah Department/ 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983); Penrod v. 
Nu Creation Creme/ Inc./ 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); Baxter v. 
Department of Transportation/ 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985). 
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The problem of application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel which is not present in this case is mutuality of 
parties. Defendasnt had every opportunity to litigate all issues 
in the matter of Hiltsley v. Ryder. She was represented by 
extremely competent counsel, present counsel on this appeal, who 
vigorously and diligently represented her through all the 
6 litigation in the action. 
7 A case which spells out carefully the use of the doctrine 
8 of collateral estoppel is B.R. De Witt v. Albert Hall, 19 NY2d 141, 
278NYS2d 596, 225 NE2d 195, 31 ALR3d 1035. 
The New York Court of Appeals then recapped the development 
in the doctrine of mutuality in the following language: 
9 
10 
13 
To recapitulate, we are saying that the "doctrine of 
12 J mutuality" is a dead letter. While we have not 
expressly so held, the trend of our decisions leads to 
this conclusion (see 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Pracj 
par 5011.42). This view finds support in other States 
(Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra; Coca Cola Co. v. 
14 | Pepsi-Cola Co., 6 WW Harr 134, 36 Del 124, 172 A 260; 
DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich 703, 62 NW2d 441; Gammel v. 
15 | Ernst Sc Ernst, 245 Minn 249, 72 NW2d 364, 54 ALR2d 316; 
Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn 515, 131 NW2d 741; Cantrell 
v. Burnett & Henderson Co., 187 Tenn 552, 216 SW2d 307; 
cf. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Berkshire Life 
Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St 395, 199 NE2d 863; see, also, 
17| Ordway v. White, 14 AD2d 498, 217 NYS2d 334; but see 
Reardon v. Allen, 88 NJ Super 560, 213 A2d 26) and 
18 | Federal courts (see, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 
327 F.2d 944 [2d Cir]; Graves v. Associated Transp., 
344 F2d 894 [4th Cir]; cf. Berner v. British Common-
Wealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F2d 532 [2d Cir.]. 
16 
19 
20 In this case, where the issues, as framed by the 
pleadings, were no broader and no different than those 
2 1 | raided in the first lawsuit; where the defendant here 
offers no reason for not holding him to the 
22 | determination in the first action; where it is 
unquestioned (and probably unquestionable) that the 
23 | first action was defended with full vigor and 
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opportunity to be heard; and where the plaintiff in 
the first action/ the operator of said vehicle/ 
although they do not technically stand in the 
2 J relationship of privity/ there is no reason either 
in policy or precedent to hold that the judgment in 
3 | the Farnum case is not conclusive in the present action 
(see Currie/ Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel/ 9 Stan 
4 I L Rev 281; Currie/ Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews/ 
53 Calif L Rev 25; Thornton/ Further Comment on 
Collateral Estoppel/ 28 Brooklyn L Rev 250). 
All of the criteria for application of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel are met in the present case. Intervenor 
submits that it is entitled to have judgment entered in accordance 
with the judgment heretofore entered by the Honorable Bryant 
9 I Croft on the 29th of March, 1983. 
10 CONCLUSION 
11 I Intervenor/Appellant submits that the statute of limitations 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
does not bar her recovery, that the facts and the cases decided 
by this court show that a constructive trust was created between 
Wood and Milton Hiltsley and the assets of Wood were traced 
through Hiltsley to the defendant Ryder. Intervenor further 
submits that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/ judgment 
should be granted in her favor and against defendant and the 
17 I assets that Judge Croft traced through that came out of the Etta 
18 I Wood property should be determined to be assets of the estate of 
19 I Etta Wood. Orders necessary to carry out this result should be 
entered by the court. 
20 | 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 1988. 
21 " 
22 | DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
23 DWIdHT L. KING 
A +• +• r>iv~incx\7 -F/-W T r 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief were mailed to DeLyle H. Condie/ Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant/ McKay/ Burton/ Thurman & Condie/ 500 
Kennecott Building/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84133/ this day 
of January/ 1988/ postage prepaid. 
